

































Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit Availability
 
Allen N. Berger and W. Scott Frame 
 
Working Paper 2005-10 
May 2005  
 
 
The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, or 
their staffs. The authors thank Will Jackson for encouraging us to write the paper, Leora Klapper for helpful suggestions, and 
Cordell Wise and Marc Bernstein for insightful conversations. The authors also thank Nate Miller, Mike Padhi, Aruna Srinivasan, 
Larry White, and Lynn Woosley for prior coauthored work on small business credit scoring without which this paper would not 
be possible. The views expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the 
Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Allen N. Berger, Senior Economist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C. 20551, Senior Fellow, Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, aberger@frb.gov, or 
W. Scott Frame (contact author), Financial Economist and Associate Policy Adviser, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree 
Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309, scott.frame@atl.frb.org. 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, are available on the Atlanta Fed’s Web site at 
www.frbatlanta.org. Click “Publications” and then “Working Papers.” Use the WebScriber Service (at www.frbatlanta.org) to 
receive e-mail notifications about new papers. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA       WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit Availability 
 
Allen N. Berger and W. Scott Frame 
 
Working Paper 2005-10 
May 2005 
 
Abstract: U.S. commercial banks are increasingly using credit scoring models to underwrite small business 
credits. This paper discusses this technology, evaluates the research findings on the effects of this 
technology on small business credit availability, and links these findings to a number of research and 
public policy issues. 
 
JEL classification: G21, G28, G34, L23 
 
Key words: banks, credit scoring, small business SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SCORING AND CREDIT AVAILABILITY 
 
1.  Introduction 
Small businesses are an important part of the economy of virtually every nation.  In the 
U.S., for example, small businesses account for about half of all private-sector employment and 
non-farm gross domestic product according to the Small Business Administration.
1  Nonetheless, 
small firms have historically faced significant difficulties in accessing funding for creditworthy 
(i.e., positive net present value) projects due to a lack of credible information about them by 
potential providers of funds.  Small businesses are typically much more informationally opaque 
than large corporations because they often do not have certified audited financial statements to 
yield credible financial information on a regular basis.  As well, these firms usually do not have 
publicly traded equity or debt, yielding no market prices or public ratings that might suggest their 
quality.  To address this opacity problem and provide funding to small firms, financial 
institutions use a number of different lending technologies. 
This paper focuses on small business credit scoring (SBCS), a lending technology used 
by many financial institutions over the last decade to evaluate applicants for “micro credits” 
under $250,000 ($250K).  SBCS involves analyzing consumer data about the owner of the firm 
and combining it with relatively limited data about the firm itself using statistical methods to 
predict future  credit performance.  Credit scores have been widely used for many years in 
consumer credit markets (e.g., mortgages, credit cards, and automobile credits), resulting in low-
cost, commoditized  credits that are often sold into secondary markets, yielding significant 
growth in consumer credit availability.  However, only in the mid-1990s did financial institutions 
begin to combine the consumer and business information to create scores for small business 
credits on a widespread basis, and to date, no significant secondary market for small business 
credits has emerged.  Below, we describe the SBCS technology and its use, review the extant 
research on its effects on credit availability (broadly defined), and discuss the key research and 
                                                 
1 See “how important are small businesses to the U.S. economy?” under “frequently asked questions” at 
<http://app1.sba.gov/faqs/faqindex.cfm?areaID=24>.  
   2 
 
 
policy issues related to this technology. 
To put SBCS into context, it is one of a number of transactions lending technologies for 
business credits based primarily on “hard” quantitative information.
2  The hard data for 
transactions technologies are relatively quickly gathered without need for prior contact with the 
firm and can be relatively easily observed, verified, and transmitted to others.  For SBCS, the 
hard information is primarily personal consumer data on the owner obtained from consumer 
credit bureaus, data on the business collected by the financial institution, and in some cases 
information on the firm from commercial credit bureaus.  While SBCS is often used to evaluate 
opaque small businesses, it may also be used for relatively transparent borrowers to reduce 
underwriting costs. 
As an alternative to the transactions technologies, financial institutions also attack the 
opacity problem using relationship lending based on “soft” qualitative information gathered 
through contact over time with the firm, and often with its owners, managers, and other members 
of the local community.  The soft information generally takes significant time to accumulate and 
is not easily observed, verified, or transmitted to others.  Financial institutions’ choices among 
the technologies used to evaluate small business credit applicants vary across both institutions 
and applicants.  These decisions depend on the comparative advantages of the institution, the 
information available about the firm, and the expected costs and accuracy of each of the feasible 
technologies, all of which affect the expected profitability. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the development of 
SBCS over the past decade.  Section 3 briefly describes a survey of SBCS that is the basis for 
much of the active research on this topic.  The literature concerning the effects of SBCS on small 
credit availability is reviewed in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses research and policy issues related 
to SBCS, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Small Business Credit Scoring 
Credit scoring is a statistical approach to predicting the probability that a credit applicant 
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will default or become delinquent.
3  While this underwriting method is well established in 
consumer credit markets, it has only been widely applied to small commercial credits for about 
the last decade.
4  The primary reason for the delayed response is the significant heterogeneity 
among borrowers (making prediction difficult) and significant variation in the underwriting 
approaches both within and across banks and for credits of various sizes (reducing the ability of 
banks to pool data).  The change occurred when analysts determined – particularly for the very 
smallest credits – that credit information for the principal owner explains a significant amount of 
the variation in the performance of small business credits.  This may reflect in part a correlation 
between personal and business success and in part a commingling of the finances of the business 
and the owner.  Incorporating this information directly into SBCS models improved prediction 
and encouraged greater underwriting standardization.   
The first SBCS models were constructed by collecting a sample of fully seasoned loans 
and then dividing them into “goods” and “bads” on the basis of a credit event such as default or 
delinquency.
5  This binary outcome was then statistically related to a number of characteristics 
about the principal owner and business that are believed to predict loan performance.  With 
respect to the principal owner, this included credit bureau information on variables such as 
income, net worth, available credit, prior delinquencies, and prior bankruptcy.  Similar 
information about the business was also used in the statistical model: financial ratios (such as 
profitability and leverage), the presence of past credit problems (if a business credit report was 
available from a commercial credit bureau like Dun & Bradstreet or Experian), as well as the 
type of business (SIC Code). While as many as 50-60 variables may have been considered when 
building a model, only 8 -12 variables were ultimately used because of significant 
                                                 
3 See Hand and Henley (1997) for a detailed overview of consumer credit scoring, including the treatment of various 
data and statistical issues regularly encountered when building these models. Similar approaches are used to 
evaluate potential applicants for solicitation (i.e., for marketing purposes) and evaluating borrowers to whom credit 
has already been extended (i.e., for monitoring purposes). 
   
4 Similar statistical techniques, such as discriminant analysis, are also used in lending to larger businesses but these 
are typically not focused on the personal credit history of the owners (Saunders 2000). 
 
5 The discussion in this paragraph relies on earlier descriptive articles by Eisenbeis (1996), Mester (1997), and 
Feldman (1997).   4 
 
 
multicolinearity.  Limited dependent variable estimation techniques, such as logit and probit, 
were then generally used to analyze the data to see how well the variables predicted the credit 
events.
6 
While some large banks, such as Wells Fargo, have developed proprietary SBCS models, 
most institutions have turned to outside vendors.  The largest external provider, Fair, Isaac and 
Company (Fair, Isaac), introduced its first SBCS model in 1995.  The model used a sample of 
more than 5000 small  business loan applications over five years from 17 large U.S. banks 
designed to represent a national pool.  This model, which was constructed in cooperation with 
the Robert Morris Associates, was further refined in 1996 using data from 25 banks.  Several 
large banks began to adopt SBCS following the introduction of the first Fair, Isaac model. 
Today, even lenders with proprietary models often purchase credit scores from outside 
vendors, especially when making loans outside of communities in which they maintain an office.  
In the case of Fair, Isaac, several models are now available through their Small Business Scoring 
Service depending on the type of credit (e.g., loans, leases, lines of credit), the type of 
information available (e.g., application data, business data, consumer data), and the size of the 
credit (e.g., less than $50K, less than $100K, less than $250K).  Although the models have been 
designed for use for credits up to $250K, some lenders use them only for amounts less than 
$100K.  The firm is currently investigating whether current models can be validated above 
$250K and also developing new models for these larger credits. 
There may be several motivations for lenders to use SBCS.  Cost saving is likely a key 
incentive when banks  purchase a score from an outside vendor and use it for automated 
accept/reject decisions and setting credit terms.  This is the lowest-cost  method of using the 
technology and it is likely significantly cheaper than any other transactions or relationship 
lending technology that might otherwise be employed to evaluate the applicants.  However, 
                                                 
 
6 Eisenbeis (1996) notes, for example, that Dun & Bradstreet’s small business credit scores were based on a logit 
model.  However, he argues that a hazard/survivorship model may be better suited for the dynamic nature of the 
problem, given that the probability of default may not be constant throughout the life of the loan.  Mester (1997) 
further notes that alternative methods of evaluating the data, such as the use of neural networks, have also been 
investigated. 
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using SBCS in this way may exacerbate the opacity problem, yield inefficient credit terms, and 
potentially result in greater future credit losses; although it still may be profitable to underwrite 
credits this way because of the cost savings.  As discussed below, research suggests that many 
banks use SBCS in this low-cost way, and these are the institutions that tend to expand their 
lending the most; thereby suggesting  it is a profitable strategy.  For other banks, the key 
incentive may be to reduce the opacity problem and set the contract terms more accurately to 
reduce future credit losses and improve expected revenues on their credits.  These improvements 
may be most likely when credit scoring is used in conjunction with another lending technology – 
i.e., through adding the scores to information gathered using one or more of the other 
technologies noted above.  As shown below, the research suggests that banks using SBCS in this 
way tend to have relatively low-risk small business credits.
7 
3.  Survey Evidence on the Use of SBCS by U.S. Banks 
The primary source of information about whether and how financial institutions use 
SBCS comes from a telephone survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in 
January 1998.  The survey queried the lead (largest) banks of the 200 largest U.S. bank holding 
companies in terms of domestic assets on whether and how they used SBCS.  Together, these 
institutions accounted for 71.3% of U.S. domestic banking assets and 53.2% of all commercial 
loans under $1 million outstanding as of June 30, 1997.  Ten banks were eliminated from the 
survey process ex ante because the either were not principally engaged in small business lending 
(less than 0.50% of banking assets in small business loans) or were credit card banks.  
Ultimately, 190 banks were called and 99 responded, a response rate of 52.1%.   
Overall, 62 of the 99 responding sample banks said that they used SBCS as of January 
1998.  The other survey questions were designed not only to gauge the pervasiveness of SBCS in 
the underwriting process, but also to uncover variation in credit scoring practices across 
institutions.  Particularly, the survey asked about: 
                                                 
7 Another potential motivation for credit scoring concerns the creation of a uniform underwriting process across 
borrowers.  This may better insulate the lender from legal liability associated with disparate treatment of different 
groups of small business applicants (Eisenbeis 1996). 
   6 
 
 
•  The credit sizes scored;  
•  Whether scores were used for the automatic approval or rejection of applications;  
•  Whether scores were used to set credit terms;   
•  Whether the bank developed its own model or if it relied on a vendor-supplied model or 
scores; and 
•  How long the bank had been using SBCS.   
Table 1 presents the survey results with respect to these questions for the 62 banks 
responding that they used SBCS.  All banks that used SBCS did so for credits under $100K, 
while 74.2% of these banks used it for credits under $250K.  Only 21.0% of the scoring banks 
used the technology on credits between $250K and $1 million.  Credit scores were used for the 
automatic approval or rejection of credits by 41.9% of scoring banks and affected credit terms at 
32% of the institutions.  The overwhelming majority of scoring banks, 87.1%, used models from 
an external vendor, rather than their own proprietary model. 
Two studies have statistically examined the determinants of the probability and timing of 
large banks adopting SBCS.  Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) and Akhavein, Frame, and 
White (2005) both find an important role for organizational structure in the adoption decision: 
banking organizations with fewer bank charters and more bank branches were more likely to 
adopt and also adopt sooner.  This suggests that large banks with a more “centralized” structure 
were more likely to adopt SBCS.  Today, however, the vast majority of large banks use SBCS 
and it is small banks that are making the adoption decisions. 
4.  SBCS and the Availability of Small Business Credit 
Several studies use the Atlanta Federal Reserve survey data to test the effects of SBCS on 
various measures of credit availability: the quantity of small business credit extended, the risk 
and opacity associated with this credit, whether low-income areas are served as well as upper-
income areas, the geographic spread of the credit, and the length of loan maturities.  As shown 
below, the findings are consistent with increases in all of these dimensions of credit availability 
due to the adoption and use of the SBCS technology. 
The first of the studies finds that the use of SBCS is associated with a significantly   7 
 
 
increased quantity of small business  credit under $100K for 1997 (Frame, Srinivasan, and 
Woosley 2001).  This finding is robust to considerations  of other banking organization 
characteristics, such as total size,  organizational structure, and  the extent of recent merger 
activity. 
Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005) extend the quantity analysis by: 1) examining credits of 
$100K-$250K (as well as those under $100K); 2) using a longer time frame (1995-1997); 3) 
analyzing bank-specific and industry learning curves; and 4) studying how differences in the way 
the technology is used influences the outcomes.  For loans under $100K, they again find that 
SBCS is associated with a significant increase in the quantity of small business credit overall; but 
that for individual institutions, it depends on how long the technology has been used and how it 
is implemented.
8  The increased quantities (and other effects described below) occur primarily 
after some time has passed for the bank to learn how to use the technology.  As well, the 
increases are concentrated in “rules” banks that purchase scores and use them to set terms and 
automatically approve/reject credits, rather than in “discretion” banks that employ their own 
models and use other factors in setting terms and approval/rejection.
9  These results suggest that 
the increases in credit availability are likely due to the reduced cost of using the SBCS 
technology, rather than a reduction in informational opacity.  As suggested above, the use of 
“rules” may exacerbate the opacity problem and result in greater future credit losses, but it still 
may be a profitable strategy because of significantly reduced costs. 
Two studies examine the characteristics of the borrowers that receive the additional small 
business credits resulting from SBCS.  Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005) find that the small 
business credits under $100K made by scoring banks tend to have higher average interest rates 
and higher average risk ratings than those of non-scoring banks.  This is generally consistent 
with an increase in lending to opaque borrowers that are typically more risky and would 
normally imply higher rates than transparent borrowers.  The higher interest rates are observed 
                                                 
8 The authors do not find significant changes in the quantity of small business credit for loans $100K-250K.   
 
9 “Rules” and “discretion” are shorthand descriptions to separate the primary approaches of the institutions.  In 
practice, all “rules” banks allow for some judgmental overrides, and all “discretion” banks have some automatic 
rejection parameters.   8 
 
 
both for banks using “rules” and “discretion” approaches to the SBCS technology; although the 
increases are much greater for “discretion” banks.  In terms of risk, “rules” banks rate their loans 
as higher risk, on average, while “discretion” banks rate them as having less risk.       
Frame, Padhi, and Woosley (2004) add two more dimensions to the characteristics of the 
likely SBCS loan recipients, income and location.  They examine variation in small business 
loans under $100K originated in 1997 by the survey banks in each U.S. census tract.  One 
finding is that SBCS is associated with increased lending of approximately the same magnitude 
in low- and moderate-income census tracts as in middle- and upper-income tracts.  Another 
finding is that banks using SBCS lend more outside of their local markets than non-scoring 
banks, all else equal.  This is expected, given that SBCS does not require close personal contact 
(as in relationship lending) or much physical monitoring (as in other transactions technologies).  
This finding also suggests that SBCS may be associated with increased competition for credits, 
given that banks are not as constrained by location and, as discussed below, may raise policy 
questions about appropriate geographic market definitions for antitrust analysis.   
Finally, Berger, Espinosa, Frame, and Miller (2005) examine the effects of using SBCS 
to reduce informational opacity on loan maturity.  They exploit the differences in the information 
sets between banks that use SBCS in a form of the “discretion” manner – that use SBCS, but not 
to automatically approve/reject applicants – versus those that do not use SBCS at all.  Thus, they 
test the effect of using credit scores in addition to information gathered using one of the other 
lending technologies in underwriting small business credits.  The authors find that debt maturity 
is significantly longer for low-risk borrowers when they borrow from “discretion” banks that use 
SBCS to reduce informational opacity.  This finding as may be viewed as additional evidence in 
favor of increased small business credit availability from SBCS – some borrowers are able to 
secure credit for longer intervals as a result of the use of this technology. 
All of the studies reviewed here find that SBCS increases small business credit 
availability in at least one dimension – overall quantity of lending, lending to relatively opaque, 
risky borrowers, lending within low-income as well as high-income areas, lending over greater 
distances, or increasing the maturity of loans.  Interestingly, the most significant increases in   9 
 
 
credit availability appear to be due to a reduction in lending costs though the application of 
“rules” that likely reduce costs, rather than a reduction in informational opacity through use of 
SBCS with “discretion”; although longer loan maturities are observed for these latter institutions. 
5.  Potential Implications of SBCS for Research and Public Policy Issues 
The results of the empirical studies surveyed above may have implications for research 
and public policy questions that have been raised over the past decade or so concerning small 
business credit availability.  These include: 1) banking industry consolidation and the emergence 
of large nationwide institutions; 2) the appropriate geographic definition for banking markets; 3) 
the potential development of a thick secondary market for small business credits, and 4) the 
proliferation of the SBCS technology.  We examine each of these issues within the context of the 
recent research on SBCS as well as that on small business finance more generally. 
A.  Bank Size and Industry Consolidation 
SBCS plays an important role in the research and policy issues regarding the comparative 
advantages of large and small banks and the consolidation of the banking industry.  A common 
research finding is that large banks have a comparative advantage in transactions lending 
technologies – including SBCS – that are based primarily on the analysis of hard quantitative 
information and small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending that is based 
primarily on soft qualitative information.  These comparative advantages may stem from 
economies (diseconomies) of scale in the processing and transmission of hard (soft) information 
(e.g., Stein 2002), agency problems in using relationship lending by large banks created by the 
wide separation between management and loan officers because the loan officer essentially has 
proprietary access to the soft information (e.g., Berger and Udell 2002), and Williamson-type 
(1988) organizational diseconomies in large banks with providing transactions loans to large 
businesses along with relationship loans to small businesses. 
A number of empirical studies provide strong support for these comparative advantages.  
Recent findings include that large banks tend to base lending decisions more on financial ratios 
than on prior relationships (e.g., Cole, Goldberg, and White 2004) and that large banks tend to 
have temporally shorter, less exclusive, less personal, a nd longer-distance associations with   10 
 
 
small business borrowers than small banks (e.g., Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 
forthcoming). 
The consolidation of the banking industry has raised considerable policy concerns and 
academic interest in whether the industry would be able to continue providing adequate credit 
availability for small businesses, particularly opaque small businesses.  In part, these concerns 
appear to reflect common beliefs that large banks are either disadvantaged in general in small 
business lending or that relationship lending is superior to all the transactions technologies for 
lending to opaque small businesses.
10   While it is possible that the disadvantage of large banks 
in relationship lending would result in reduced supplies of small business credit relative to the 
small banks they replace, this is not necessarily the case because of the advantage of large banks 
in the transactions lending technologies, including SBCS.  Large banks may be better able to 
supply credit to relatively transparent small businesses, and they may be less, equally, or better 
able to supply credit to opaque firms.  For transparent small businesses with strong, audited 
financial statements, large banks may use their advantage in the transactions technology of 
financial statement lending to provide more credit than the small banks they replace.  For opaque 
small businesses, large banks may use their advantage in other transactions technologies  – 
SBCS, asset-based lending, leasing, and factoring – which may provide credit availability that is 
on average less than, equal to, or greater than the relationship lending provided by the small 
banks they replace. 
A limited amount of recent evidence suggests that banking industry consolidation may 
have little or no  net effect on small business credit availability.  One study finds that the 
likelihood of a small business borrowing from a large bank is roughly proportional to the local 
deposit market share of these banks (Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2005) and another finds that small 
business credit availability is not related to the local market share of large banks (Jayaratne and 
Wolken 1999).  Other research that takes into account the dynamic effects of mergers and 
                                                 
10 A number of studies find that large banks have relatively low ratios of small business loans/assets (e.g., Berger, 
Kashyap, and Scalise 1995).  This finding is often misconstrued as direct evidence of a disadvantage of large banks 
in small business lending, the numerator of the ratio.  However, it is just as likely that this finding primarily reflects 
the fact that large banks may expand the assets in the denominator of the ratio, as large banks have more large 
business loans because of greater legal lending limits and better diversification.   11 
 
 
acquisitions (M&As) – including temporary disruptions and strategic changes in behavior – finds 
that these events often do reduce small business lending by the participating banks.  However, 
these studies also find that “external effects” or general equilibrium effects occur that tend to 
offset the reduction in credit availability.  Other banks that are already present in the same local 
markets respond by increasing their own supplies of small business credit (e.g., Berger, 
Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998, Avery and Samolyk 2004).  In addition, new small banks (de 
novo entrants) are often created that tend to specialize in small business lending (Berger, 
Bonime, Goldberg, and White 2004). 
Bank consolidation will likely continue.  Some research suggests that technological 
progress favors large banks over small banks, possibly in part because advances in information 
technologies and financial technologies tend to improve the hard information lending methods 
more than relationship lending, which changes relatively little over time (e.g., Berger 2003).
   As 
discussed below, technological change may favor multimarket banks over single-market banks as 
well.  Nonetheless, the  literature  also suggests that a segment of small, community banks 
remains quite profitable and is likely to remain viable in its niche in the future (e.g., DeYoung, 
Hunter, and Udell 2004). 
Finally, despite the general comparative advantage of large banks in hard information 
technologies, it is important to note that small banks are not precluded from using SBCS.  Any 
bank in the U.S. may purchase a score from an external vendor and thereby benefit from the 
scale economies in gathering and processing the data and developing the prediction models.  
Unfortunately, the available data does not provide any information on the extent to which small 
banks use SBCS. 
B.  The Effects of SBCS on Local Market Competition and Antitrust Issues 
U.S. antitrust analysis is conducted in the context of definitions of the relevant product 
and geographic markets.  For banking, the product market definition is considered t o be a 
“cluster” of products and services that are offered  primarily  by commercial banks.  The 
geographic market definition is local  –  generally encompassing the  Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) or non-MSA county in which the affected bank branches are located.  The vast   12 
 
 
majority of the research on bank competition in the U.S. has also adopted this same local market 
definition, although many products within the cluster of banking services are offered across 
much wider geographic areas.  Small business  lending, an important product for commercial 
banks, has historically been considered a local  activity, although  this may be changing.  As 
discussed above, one of the SBCS credit availability studies found that SBCS is associated with 
more small business lending outside of the bank’s local markets (Frame, Padhi, and Woosley 
2004).  This is not surprising, given that SBCS does not require close contact with the borrower.  
This finding is also consistent with small business lending at greater distances by large banks 
found by other researchers without information on which lending technologies the banks use 
(e.g., Petersen and Rajan 2002, Hannan 2003, Hannan and Brevoort 2004).
11   
This research is also part of a bigger picture in which large, multimarket banking 
organizations appear to be improving their abilities over time to manage their retail lines of 
business over greater distances and compete more effectively against small, single-market banks.  
Examples of findings include reduced distance-related diseconomies of management (e.g., 
Berger and DeYoung forthcoming); more uniform pricing of deposits within a state (e.g., 
Hannan and Prager 2004, Heitfield and Prager 2004), different prices for single-market banks in 
local markets with greater shares of multimarket banks (e.g., Hannan and Prager 2004, Park and 
Pennacchi 2004, Berger, Rosen, and Udell 2005), and significantly reduced performance of 
small, single-market banks in these markets (Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White 2005).   
All of these findings suggest that technological change – including the introduction of 
SBCS  – may have increased the competition for small business customers and potentially 
widened the geographic area over which these firms may search for credit.  Presumably, a small 
business with an acceptable credit score could now shop nationwide through the Internet among 
lenders using SBCS, although the exact extent to which this occurs is unknown.
12  What is clear, 
                                                 
11 The increased distances in the other studies may also reflect the use of other transactions technologies that do not 
require close contact with the firm (e.g., financial statement lending). 
 
12 A perusal of websites for Capital One and American Express suggest that this is plausible for very small credits.  
Capital One appears to offer small business credit card products with lines up to $20K and SBA-guaranteed loans 
for amounts up to $50K.  American Express offers small business credit lines and term loans (24 or 36 months) for 
amounts between $10K-100K.   13 
 
 
however, is that historical local market definitions for bank competition used in antitrust analysis 
are being strained, that competition for small business credit is considerably greater than in the 
past, and that small business credit availability has increased as a result. 
C.  Secondary Markets for Small Business Credits 
The development of a deep secondary market for small business credits has long been 
predicted, but has not yet occurred.  The most recently cited reasons for this are the lack of 
standardized underwriting practices as well as an abundance of bank liquidity in the 1990s 
(Temkin and Kormedi 2003).  The lack of standardized underwriting, coupled with borrower 
heterogeneity results in severe asymmetric information problems between potential buyers and 
sellers of credits.  SBCS may serve to ameliorate such information problems, and ultimately aid 
in the development of secondary markets for small business credits, especially if an industry 
scoring standard becomes accepted that serves to economize on the number of metrics that 
investors have to interpret.
13  That said, the liquidity need for such a market is unclear, especially 
for commercial banks that maintain large portfolios of liquid assets or assets that may be 
relatively quickly sold or securitized (e.g., cash, securities, consumer  credits, residential 
mortgages) and have relatively easy access to additional debt financing in the form of federally 
insured deposits, federal funds, and Federal Home Loan Bank advances.  A secondary market for 
small business credits may be more appealing to non-bank financial institutions, although the 
extent to which they rely on SBCS is presently unclear.  
The limited secondary market for small business credits that exists is for loans guaranteed 
by the Small Business Administration (SBA) under their Section 7(a) program.  Further, this 
securitization market is largely comprised of loans originated by non-bank financial institutions 
(Temkin and Kormendi 2003, Table 2).  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2002, p. 60) presents data on the SBA’s Section 7(a) program as well as securitization activity 
in these small business loans and others.
14  The SBA loans are the most amenable to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 For example, in consumer loan securitizations, borrower credit scores from Fair, Isaac (FICO scores) are 
universally accepted measures of credit quality. 
14 About half of the guaranteed portion of SBA 7(a) loans are currently securitized.  In this case, the guaranteed 
portion of the loan balance (75-80 percent depending on loan size with a maximum of $750,000) is first separated   14 
 
 
securitization because of the federal guarantee as well as standardized underwriting, loan 
characteristics, and collateral.      
The implementation of the Basel II capital accord may help encourage secondary markets 
for relatively safe small business credits by concentrating the benefits of holding them.  In the 
U.S., the largest banking organizations (at the least the largest 10 and perhaps another 10 to 20 
organizations) will adopt Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II, while 
other banks will stay on Basel I requirements.  As currently designed, the A-IRB approach gives 
small business  credits managed as “retail exposures”  – presumably including  credits based 
primarily on SBCS – and some loans to firms with under €50 million in sales preferential capital 
treatment generally, and the capital reduction is greater, the safer is the credit.
15  This would 
reduce the marginal costs to the large banks of holding small business  credits that receive 
favorable capital treatment. 
While i t is not possible to accurately estimate the effect on marginal costs, one study 
estimates an upper bound for the average large U.S. bank for its average small business loan of 
about 16 basis points (Berger 2004).  This may create a substantial incentive to start a secondary 
market because the capital benefits are concentrated in the relatively few large banking 
organizations operating under Basel II that could buy the credits from others.  This could occur 
through the securitization of loan pools as in other areas of consumer finance, like credit cards, 
or through outright loan sales.  One example of the latter phenomenon is Wells Fargo’s “agent 
banking program,” whereby participating community banks originate small business loans based 
on Wells Fargo’s proprietary credit scoring models and then sell the loans to Wells Fargo and 
receive an origination fee.  Such direct sales methods, if adopted by other large banks, could 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the unguaranteed portion.  Securities are then issued against guaranteed portion using a simple structure, not 
unlike mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac.  The unguaranteed portion of 
SBA loans usually remains on the originators’ balance sheet, although in some cases these amounts have been 
securitized as well using more complicated security structures often coupled with “spread accounts” to provide 
sufficient credit enhancement.   
 
15 In other nations, the largest banks will likely adopt one of the IRB approaches and small banks will likely adopt 
the Standardized Approach, which gives a 25% reduction in required capital on some small business loans 
(estimated to be about half of them in Spain, see Saurina and Trucharte 2004). 
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have significant effects in encouraging more widespread use of SBCS by community banks and 
non-bank lenders.   
In the future, government participation may aid in the development of secondary markets 
for small business credits, although government subsidies can be socially counterproductive to 
the extent they encourage negative net present value lending.  In 1994, the Riegle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act took two steps aimed at reducing transactions 
costs for this market: 1) removing state-level investment restrictions and securities registration 
requirements and the establishment of favorable federal regulatory treatment, and 2) reducing 
capital requirements for securitized loans in which recourse is retained (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve 2002).  Since then, there has been  some discussion of creating a 
government-sponsored or government-owned enterprise to guarantee payment on securities 
backed by small business loans.
16  This would shift the information-related risks and attendant 
transactions costs associated with the secondary market for small business loans from originators 
and investors to taxpayers.    The most recent incarnation of this idea was originally provided for 
in a Senate bill reauthorizing SBA programs for 2004-2006 (S. 1375) that would have given the 
SBA permission to create a pilot program to guarantee a portion of the return on securitized 
pools of non-SBA-guaranteed small business loans.  This provision was ultimately struck from 
the final bill, but remains as stand-alone legislation – The Small Business Liquidity Act of 2003 
(S. 1713).
17  Notably, a joint report issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2000) concluded that there were no major 
impediments to the development of this market that required further legislative or administrative 
                                                 
16 In the mortgage market, analogous institutions already exist.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-
sponsored enterprises with federal charters, but publicly traded shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  
Ginnie Mae, by contrast, is a government-owned corporation. 
17 This proposal would involve the SBA providing, for a fee, credit enhancement guarantees of, or a commitment to 
guarantee, a portion of the principal and interest on securities issued and managed by not less than two qualified 
entities authorized and approved by the SBA.  (The SBA would be required to set and maintain standards for 
qualified entities, including standards relating to delinquency, default, liquidation, and loss rates.)  The SBA's credit 
enhancement guarantees would act as second-loss guarantees, available only after the full payment of guarantees 
offered by the qualified entities authorized to act as issuers and managers of pools or trusts of loans.  The legislation 




D.  The Proliferation of SBCS 
The use of SBCS will likely continue to evolve.  We discuss two broad trends that appear 
to be occurring: 1) increasing usage of SBCS in the U.S. and abroad, and 2) innovations that may 
expand the coverage of the technology to more potential borrowers and larger credits.  Each of 
these will further be enhanced to the extent that a thick secondary market for small business 
loans develops.  
SBCS has become an entrenched technology in the U.S. that is now used by banks of all 
sizes, although large banks remain the most likely to automatically approve/reject credits and set 
contract terms based on credit scores.  Thus, large U.S. banks are more likely to take a “rules” 
approach to SBCS, while small banks use greater  “discretion”.  Outside of the U.S., SBCS 
appears to be  used on a widespread basis only in a limited number of developed nations.  
However, there are some efforts to expand SBCS to developing nations: the World Bank and 
Fair, Isaac have recently formed a joint venture to determine the feasibility of developing a 
pooled-data SBCS models for Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico (Miller and Rojas 2004).
18 
As noted above, most SBCS models rely heavily on the personal credit history of the 
principal owner  provided by  one  or more  of the consumer credit bureaus ( e.g.,  Equifax, 
Experian, or TransUnion).  As well, in some cases, the models also use business data provided 
by a commercial credit bureau (e.g., Dun & Bradstreet).  It follows that the availability of 
information on more consumers or businesses or more detailed data on them may aid the 
proliferation of SBCS.  Some recent developments suggest that some of these changes may be 
occurring. 
With respect to consumer information, Fair, Isaac has launched a new consumer scoring 
system based on how well consumers handle their bank accounts or payments on retail purchase 
plans in an effort to reach consumers that do not have enough credit history to generate 
                                                 
18 At least one multinational banking organization uses a form of SBCS in developing nations.  Citibank’s 
“Citibusiness” initiative targets credit to small and medium enterprises in industrial segments of a nation identified 
as having growth potential based on industry-level hard information, in some cases without historical credit 
information on the specific firms. 
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traditional consumer scores (Kim 2 004).  The new system could add scores on 25 million 
consumers in addition to the 160 million consumers that currently have scores.  In the long run, 
this could result in greater use of SBCS as more business owners have consumer scores for use 
in generating the small business scores. 
With respect to business information, Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) has greatly expanded the 
number of companies covered as well as the depth of information provided.
19  Further, they have 
entered into a business alliance with Fair, Isaac, which involves D&B sharing their business 
credit database and Fair, Isaac building various scoring models.
20  The more detailed business 
data may be particularly helpful in the development of models aimed at larger credits (e.g., 
between $250K and $10  million), for which business information likely becomes of greater 
importance relative to consumer information. Another example of expanded business coverage is 
that Equifax is maintaining a credit information repository on behalf of the non-profit Small 
Business Financial Exchange, which includes participation by 23 of the 25 largest U.S. small 
business lenders.  This improved pooling of information may combat fraud and reduce lender 
risks and from borrowers obtaining credit from multiple sources.
21 
6.  Conclusions 
Small business credit scoring (SBCS) is a relatively new transactions lending technology 
for making  “micro  credits” under $250,000 ($250K)  that was adopted by most large U.S. 
banking organizations in the latter half of 1990s and has since become more widely used in the 
U.S. and abroad.  The extant research strongly suggests that SBCS has increased small business 
credit availability in a number of dimensions, including:  increasing the quantity of credit 
extended;  increasing  lending to relatively opaque, risky borrowers;  increasing  lending within 
                                                 
19 They now offer an entire suite of risk management products that can be accessed over the Internet either on a 





21 See <http://www.equifax.com/EquifaxSMB/html/worksFull.htm>.  Without a centralized information exchange, 
large nationwide small business lenders have been soliciting business from many of the same customers.  These 
customers may appear to be relatively low risk ex ante, their risk of default increases markedly ex post if they accept 
a number of these offers simultaneously.  
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low-income areas; lending over greater distances; and increasing loan maturity. 
Banks tend to use the SBCS technology in very different ways to achieve very different 
objectives.  In some cases, banks use “rules” to automatically accept/reject credit applicants and 
to set credit terms based on purchased credit scores.  The primary motive for these banks is likely 
reduced underwriting costs.  This method may exacerbate informational opacity problems, yield 
less accurate credit terms, and result in greater future credit losses, but  may  nevertheless be 
profitable because of the lower costs.  The research suggests that most of the increases in credit 
availability are concentrated in these “rules” banks. 
Other institutions use more of their own “discretion” by  adding  credit scores to 
information gathered one or more of the other lending technologies.  The motives for these banks 
are likely to reduce opacity problems and set the credit terms more accurately to reduce future 
credit losses and improve expected revenues, although this  method also  raises underwriting 
costs.  The research suggests that “discretion” banks are successful in lowering the reported risk 
and lengthening the maturity of their small business credits. 
The effect of SBCS on credit availability is related to a number of important research and 
policy questions concerning:  Bank size and industry consolidation; Bank competition and the 
appropriate  geographic market definition for  banking  research and antitrust  analysis; 
Development of secondary markets for small business credits; and Proliferation of the SBCS 
technology.  With regard to issues of  bank size and consolidation, the research suggests that 
SBCS is one of several “hard” information  transactions  lending technologies in which large 
banks have a comparative advantage, whereas small banks have a comparative advantage in 
relationship lending using “soft” information.  The recent research does not suggest, however, 
that bank sizes or consolidation are associated with significant differences in small business 
credit availability overall or for opaque small businesses in particular.  Large banks may use 
SBCS and the other transactions technologies to supply credit to opaque firms.  Notably, despite 
the comparative advantage of large banks, small banks also have access to SBCS by purchasing 
scores from external vendors.  
With regard to bank competition and geographic banking market definitions, the data   19 
 
 
suggest that SBCS is associated with lending at greater distances from the bank, and this is part 
of a larger, technologically-driven phenomenon in which large, multimarket banks are competing 
more effectively against small, single-market banks.  These changes imply greater competition 
for small businesses credits and potentially greater credit availability  in any one local market, 
given that the potential competitive suppliers may be located outside the market.  This also raises 
significant questions about the use of the local market as the definition for antitrust purposes. 
With respect to  potential development of  a significant  secondary market for small 
business credits, continued improvements in the SBCS technology and possible acceptance of an 
industry standard may help, but bank demand for the additional liquidity appears limited.  The 
Basel II Accord may encourage the development of such a market by concentrating the benefits 
of holding  some relatively safe  small business credits in the very largest U.S. banking 
organizations through reduced capital requirements on these credits.  This could occur through a 
market for securitized credits similar to markets for  consumer  credit card and residential 
mortgage debt.  Alternatively, the market could develop through direct loan sales from small 
banks to large institutions.  A secondary market could also be aided by other regulatory changes 
or government subsidies via credit guarantees or loan purchases, although such subsidies may be 
counterproductive by encouraging negative net present value lending. 
With respect to proliferation of SBCS, the technology has spread from mostly large U.S. 
institutions to banks of all sizes in the U.S as well as to banks in a few developed nations.  Some 
recent developments by credit bureaus and credit scoring vendors may result in u seful credit 
information being available on more consumers and businesses, and in some cases, more detailed 
information on existing businesses.  These developments may eventually expand the availability 
of SBCS to more businesses and possibly allow SBCS to be applied to larger credits.  
Given the importance of these research and policy issues, further research about SBCS 
and credit availability  is needed.  Unfortunately,  there is a noticeable lack of new publicly 
available data on which to conduct additional research, given that the last survey was in 1998.  
Hence, it seems that new SBCS surveys could be conducted that document the proliferation of 
the technology to small U.S. banks and to other nations.  Further, information about changes in   20 
 
 
the quality and depth of commercial credit information, the creation of new models, and the 
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